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Abstract— The fading wire-tap channel is investigated, where
the source-to-destination channel and the source-to-wire-tapper
channel are corrupted by multiplicative fading gain coefficients
in addition to additive Gaussian noise terms. The channel state
information is assumed to be known at both the transmitter
and the receiver. The parallel wire-tap channel with independent
subchannels is first studied, which serves as an information-
theoretic model for the fading wire-tap channel. Each subchannel
is assumed to be a general broadcast channel and is not
necessarily degraded. The secrecy capacity of the parallel wire-
tap channel is established, which is the maximum rate at which
the destination node can decode the source information with
small probability of error and the wire-tapper does not obtain
any information. This result is then specialized to give the
secrecy capacity of the fading wire-tap channel, which is achieved
with the source node dynamically changing the power allocation
according to the channel state realization. An optimal source
power allocation is obtained to achieve the secrecy capacity.
This power allocation is different from the water-filling allocation
that achieves the capacity of fading channels without the secrecy
constraint.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless communication has a broadcast nature, where
security issues are captured by a basic wire-tap channel intro-
duced by Wyner in [1]. In this model, a source node wishes
to transmit confidential information to a destination node and
wishes to keep a wire-tapper as ignorant of this information as
possible. The performance measure of interest is the secrecy
capacity, which is the largest reliable communication rate from
the source node to the destination node with the wire-tapper
obtaining no information. For the wire-tap channel where the
channel from the source node to the destination and the wire-
tapper is degraded, the secrecy capacity was given in [1] for
the discrete memoryless channel and in [2] for the Gaussian
channel. The general wire-tap channel without a degradedness
assumption and with an additional common message for both
the destination node and the wire-tapper was considered in
[3], where the capacity-equivocation region and the secrecy
capacity were given. The wire-tap channel was also considered
recently for the fading and multiple antenna channels in
[4], [5]. The secrecy capacity was addressed either for the
case with a fixed fading state or from the outage probability
viewpoint.
In this paper, we study the ergodic secrecy capacity of
the fading wire-tap channel, which is the maximum secrecy
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rate that can be achieved over multiple fading states. We
assume the fading gain coefficients of the source-to-destination
channel and the source-to-wire-tapper channel are stationary
and ergodic over time. We also assume both the transmitter and
the receiver know the channel state information (CSI). Note
that the CSI of the source-to-wire-tapper channel at the source
can be justified as follows. In wireless networks, a node may
be treated as a “wire-tapper” by a source node because it is not
the intended destination of particular confidential messages. In
this case, the “wire-tapper” is not a hostile node, and may also
expect its own information from the same source node. Hence
it is reasonable to assume that this “wire-tapper” feeds back
the CSI to the source node.
The fading wire-tap channel can be viewed as a special case
of the parallel wire-tap channel with independent subchannels
in that the channel at each fading state realization corresponds
to one subchannel. Hence we first study a parallel wire-tap
channel with L independent subchannels. Each subchannel
is assumed to be a general broadcast channel and is not
necessarily degraded, which is different from the model stud-
ied in [6]. This channel model also differs from the model
studied in [6] in that the wire-tapper can receive outputs from
all subchannels. The secrecy capacity of the parallel wire-
tap channel is established. This result then specializes to the
secrecy capacity of a parallel wire-tap channel with K +M
degraded subchannels, which is directly related to the fading
wire-tap channel. For this model, we assume each of the K
subchannels satisfies the condition that the output at the wire-
tapper is a degraded version of the output at the destination
node, and each of the M subchannels satisfies the condition
that the output at the destination node is a degraded version
of the output at the wire-tapper. We show that to achieve the
secrecy capacity, it is optimal to keep the inputs to the M
subchannels null, i.e., use only the K subchannels, and choose
the inputs to the K subchannels independently. Therefore, the
secrecy capacity reduces to the sum of the secrecy capacities
of the K subchannels.
We further apply our result to obtain the secrecy capacity
of the fading wire-tap channel. The fading wire-tap channel
we study differs from the parallel Gaussian wire-tap channel
studied in [7] in that we assume the source node is subject to
an average power constraint over all fading state realization
instead of each subchannel (channel corresponding to one
fading state realization) being subject to a power constraint
as assumed in [7]. Since the source node knows the CSI,
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it needs to optimize the power allocation among fading
states to achieve the secrecy capacity. We obtain the optimal
power allocation scheme, where the source node uses more
power when the source-to-destination channel experiences a
larger fading gain and the source-to-wire-tapper channel has a
smaller fading gain. The secrecy capacity is not achieved by
the water-filling allocation that achieves the capacity for the
fading channel without the secrecy constraint.
In this paper, we use X[1,L] to indicate a group of variables
(X1, X2, . . . , XL), and use Xn[1,L] to indicate a group of
vectors (Xn1 , X
n
2 , . . . , X
n
L), where Xnl indicates the vector
(Xl1, Xl2, . . . , Xln). Throughout the paper, the logarithmic
function is to the base 2.
The paper is organized as follows. We first introduce the
parallel wire-tap channel with independent subchannels, and
present the secrecy capacity for this channel. We next present
the secrecy capacity for the fading wire-tap channel. We finally
demonstrate our results by numerical examples.
II. PARALLEL WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
We consider a parallel wire-tap channel with L independent
subchannels (see Fig. 1), which consists of L finite input
alphabets X[1,L], and 2L finite output alphabets Y[1,L] and
Z[1,L]. The transition probability distribution is given by
p(y[1,L], z[1,L]|x[1,L]) =
L∏
l=1
pl(yl, zl|xl) (1)
where xl ∈ Xl, yl ∈ Yl, and zl ∈ Zl for l = 1, . . . , L.
Note that each of the L subchannels is assumed to be a
general broadcast channel and is not necessarily degraded as
assumed in [1]. Hence the model we study is more general
than the parallel channel model studied in [6] which assumes
each subchannel is less noisy [8].
A
(
2nR, n
)
code consists of the following:
• One message set: W = {1, 2, . . . , 2nR} with the message
W uniformly distributed over W ;
• One (stochastic) encoder at the source node that maps
each message w ∈ W to a codeword xn[1,L];
• One decoder at the destination node that maps a received
sequence yn[1,L] to a message w ∈ W .
The secrecy level of the message W at the wire-tapper is
measured by the equivocation rate defined as follows:
1
n
H
(
W
∣∣∣Zn[1,L]) . (2)
The higher the equivocation rate, the less information the wire-
tapper obtains.
A rate-equivocation pair (R,Re) is achievable if there exists
a sequence of
(
2nR, n
)
codes with the destination decoding
error probability P (n)e → 0 as n goes to infinity and with the
equivocation rate Re satisfying
Re ≤ lim
n→∞
1
n
H
(
W
∣∣∣Zn[1,L]) . (3)
We focus on the case where perfect secrecy is achieved,
i.e., the wire-tapper does not obtain any information about the
message W . This happens if Re = R. The secrecy capacity
Cs is the maximum R such that (R,Re = R) is achievable,
i.e.,
Cs = max
Achievable (R,Re=R)
R. (4)
We obtain the following secrecy capacity result for the
parallel wire-tap channel.
Theorem 1: The secrecy capacity of the parallel wire-tap
channel with L subchannels is
Cs =
L∑
l=1
Cls (5)
where Cls is the secrecy capacity of subchannel l and is given
by
Cls = max I(Ul;Yl)− I(Ul;Zl) (6)
where the maximum in the preceding equation is over the
distributions p(ul, xl)p(yl, zl|xl), which satisfies the Markov
chain condition Ul → Xl → (Yl, Zl).
The proof of Theorem 1 is relegated to Section III.
In the following, we consider a parallel wire-tap channel,
where each subchannel is either degraded such that the output
at the wire-tapper is a degraded version of the output at the
destination node, or degraded such that the output at the
destination node is a degraded version of the output at the
wire-tapper. This channel specializes to the fading wiretap
channel that is considered in Section IV, and is hence of
particular interest.
More formally, we define the channel described above
to be the parallel wire-tap channel with K + M degraded
subchannels (see Fig. 2), which consists of K+M finite input
alphabets X[1,K] and X˜[1,M ], 2(K+M) finite output alphabets
Y[1,K],Z[1,K], Y˜[1,M ], and Z˜[1,M ]. The transition probability
distribution is given by
p(y[1,K], y˜[1,M ], z[1,K], z˜[1,M ]|x[1,K], x˜[1,M ])
=
K∏
k=1
pk(yk, zk|xk)
M∏
m=1
pm(y˜m, z˜m|x˜m)
(7)
where xk ∈ Xk, yk ∈ Yk, and zk ∈ Zk for k = 1, . . . ,K , and
x˜m ∈ X˜m, y˜m ∈ Y˜m, and z˜m ∈ Z˜m for m = 1, . . . ,M . The
probability distributions pk(yk, zk|xk) and pm(y˜m, z˜m|x˜m)
satisfy the following degraded conditions:
pk(yk, zk|xk) = pk(yk|xk)pk(zk|yk)
for k = 1, . . . ,K,
pm(y˜m, z˜m|x˜m) = pm(z˜m|x˜m)pm(y˜m|z˜m)
for m = 1, . . . ,M ;
(8)
i.e., the following Markov chain conditions are satisfied
Xk →Yk → Zk for k = 1, . . . ,K,
X˜m →Z˜m → Y˜m for m = 1, . . . ,M.
(9)
The following secrecy capacity follows easily from Theo-
rem 1.
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Fig. 1. Parallel wire-tap channel
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Fig. 2. Parallel wire-tap channel with K +M degraded subchannels
Corollary 1: The secrecy capacity of the parallel wire-tap
channel with K +M degraded subchannels is
Cs =
K∑
k=1
Cks (10)
where Cks is the secrecy capacity of subchannel k and is given
by
Cks = max
p(xk)
I(Xk;Yk)− I(Xk;Zk). (11)
Remark 1: It is optimal to choose the inputs to the K
subchannels independently and set the inputs to the M
subchannels to be null. Hence the M subchannels do not
contribute to the secrecy capacity. This is intuitive because the
wire-tapper obtains all information that the destination node
obtains over the M subchannels.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
The achievability follows from [3, Corollary 2] by setting
U = (U1, . . . , UL), X = (X1, . . . , XL), Y = (Y1, . . . , YL),
and Z = (Z1, . . . , ZL), and choosing the components of U
and X to be independent.
To show the converse, we consider a code with length n
and average error probability Pe. The probability distribution
on W ×Xn[1,L] × Y
n
[1,L] ×Z
n
[1,L] is given by
p(w, xn[1,L], y
n
[1,L], z
n
[1,L])
= p(w)p(xn[1,L]|w)
n∏
i=1
L∏
l=1
pl(yli, zli|xli)
(12)
By Fano’s inequality [9, Sec. 2.11], we have
H(W |Y n[1,L]) ≤ nRPe + 1 := nδ (13)
3
where δ → 0 if Pe → 0.
We now bound the equivocation rate Re:
nRe
≤ H
(
W |Zn[1,L]
)
= H
(
W |Zn[1,L]
)
−H(W ) +H(W )
−H
(
W |Y n[1,L]
)
+H
(
W |Y n[1,L]
)
(a)
≤ I(W ;Y n[1,L])− I(W ;Z
n
[1,L]) + nδ
=
L∑
l=1
[
I(W ;Y nl |Y
n
[1,l−1])− I(W ;Z
n
l |Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ nδ
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(W ;Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )
− I(W ;Zli|Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ nδ
(b)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(WZnl[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )
− I(Znl[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|WY
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )
− I(WY n[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
+ I(Y n[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|WZ
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ nδ
(c)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(WZnl[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )
− I(WY n[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ nδ
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(Znl[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L];Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l )
+ I(W ;Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
− I(Y n[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l ;Zli|Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
− I(W ;Zli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ nδ
(d)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(W ;Yli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
− I(W ;Zli|Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L])
]
+ nδ
(e)
=
L∑
l=1
n∑
i=1
[
I(Uli;Yli|Qli)− I(Uli;Zli|Qli)
]
+ nδ
(14)
where (a) follows from Fano’s inequality, (b) follows from
the chain rule, (c) and (d) follow from Lemma 7 in [3], and
(e) follows from the following definition:
Qli := (Y
n
[1,l−1]Y
i−1
l Z
n
l[i+1]Z
n
[l+1,L]), Uli = (WQli).
(15)
We note that (Qli, Uli, Xli, Yli, Zli) satisfy the following
Markov chain condition:
Qli → Uli → Xli → (Yli, Zli). (16)
We introduce a random variable G that is independent of
all other random variables, and is uniformly distributed over
{1, 2, . . . , n}. Define Ql = (G,QlG), Ul = (G,UlG), Xl =
XlG, Yl = YlG, and Zl = ZlG. Note that (Ql, Ul, Xl, Yl, Zl)
satisfy the following Markov chain condition:
Ql → Ul → Xl → (Yl, Zl). (17)
Using the above definitions, (14) becomes
Re ≤
L∑
l=1
[
I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
]
+ δ (18)
Therefore, an upper bound on Re is
Re ≤ max
L∑
l=1
[
I(Ul;Yl|Ql)− I(Ul;Zl|Ql)
]
+ δ (19)
where the maximum is over the probability distributions
p(q[1,L], u[1,L], x[1,L], y[1,L], z[1,L]). Finally, we note that each
term in the summation in (19) depends only on the dis-
tribution p(ql, ul, xl, yl, zl). Hence there is no loss of op-
timality to consider only the distributions with the form∏L
l=1 p(ql, ul, xl)p(yl, zl|xl). We also note that each term in
the summation in (19) is maximized by a constant Ql. Hence
the following bound does not lose optimality:
Re ≤
L∑
l=1
max
[
I(Ul;Yl)− I(Ul;Zl)
]
+ δ (20)
where the maximum for the l-th term in the summation is
over the distributions p(ul, xl)p(yl, zl|xl) for l = 1, . . . , L.
This concludes the converse proof.
IV. FADING WIRE-TAP CHANNEL
We study the fading wire-tap channel (see Fig. 3), where the
source-to-destination channel and the source-to-wire-tapper
channel are corrupted by multiplicative fading processes in
addition to additive white Gaussian processes. The channel
input-output relationship is given by
Yi = h1iXi +Wi,
Zi = h2iXi + Vi,
(21)
where i is the time index, and Xi is the channel input at
the time instant i, and Yi and Zi are channel outputs at the
time instant i, respectively. The channel gain coefficients h1i
and h2i are zero-mean proper complex random variables. We
define hi := (h1i, h2i), and assume {hi} is a stationary and
ergodic vector random process. The noise processes {Wi} and
{Vi} are zero-mean independent identically distributed (i.i.d.)
proper complex Gaussian with Wi and Vi having variances
µ2 and ν2, respectively. The input sequence {Xi} is subject
to the average power constraint P , i.e., 1
n
∑n
i=1 E
[
X2i
]
≤ P .
We assume the channel state information (realization of hi) is
known at both the transmitter and the receiver instantaneously.
As we mentioned in the introduction, the source node gets the
CSI of the channel to the wire-tapper when the wire-tapper
is not an actual hostile node and is only not the intended
destination node for a particular confidential message.
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Fig. 3. Fading Wire-tap Channel
We first introduce the following lemma that follows from
[10, lemma 1]. This lemma is useful to obtain the secrecy
capacity of the fading wire-tap channel.
Lemma 1: The secrecy capacity of the wire-tap channel
depends only on the marginal transition distributions p(y|x)
of the source-to-destination channel and p(z|x) of the source-
to-wire-tapper channel.
The following generalization of the result in [2] follows
directly from Lemma 1.
Corollary 2: The secrecy capacity of the Gaussian wire-tap
channel given in [2, Theorem 1] holds for the case with general
correlation between the noise variables at the destination node
and the wire-tapper.
Based on Lemma 1 and Corollary 1, we obtain the secrecy
capacity of the fading wire-tap channel.
Theorem 2: The secrecy capacity of the fading wire-tap
channel is
Cs = max
EA[P (h)]≤P
EA
[
log
(
1 +
P (h)|h1|2
µ2
)
− log
(
1 +
P (h)|h2|2
ν2
)]
.
(22)
where A :=
{
h : |h1|
2
µ2
>
|h2|
2
ν2
}
. The random vector h =
(h1, h2) has the same distribution as the marginal distribution
of the process {hi} at one time instant.
The optimal power allocation that achieves the secrecy
capacity in (22) is given by
P ∗(h) =


1
λ ln 2 −
µ2
|h1|2
, if |h2|2 = 0, λ < 1ln 2
|h1|
2
µ2
1
2
√(
ν2
|h2|2
− µ
2
|h1|2
)(
4
λ ln 2 −
µ2
|h1|2
+ ν
2
|h2|2
)
− 12
(
µ2
|h1|2
+ ν
2
|h2|2
)
,
if |h2|2 > 0, |h1|
2
µ2
>
|h2|
2
ν2
,
λ < 1ln 2
(
|h1|
2
µ2
− |h2|
2
ν2
)
0, otherwise
(23)
where λ is chosen to satisfy the power constraint EA[P (h)] =
P .
Remark 2: The optimal power allocation (23) to achieve
the secrecy capacity is not water-filling. This is in contrast to
the fading channel without the secrecy constraint where water-
filling allocation is optimal to achieve the capacity [11].
Remark 3: The secrecy capacity in Theorem 2 is estab-
lished for general fading processes {hi} where only ergodic
and stationary conditions are assumed. The fading process
{hi} can be correlated across time, and is not necessarily
Gaussian. The two component processes {h1i} and {h2i} can
be correlated as well.
Remark 4: The secrecy capacity in Theorem 2 is estab-
lished for the case with general correlation between the noise
variables Wi and Vi.
Proof: The fading wire-tap channel can be viewed as
a parallel wire-tap channel with each subchannel having the
following form
Y = h1X +W,
Z = h2X + V,
(24)
where (h1, h2) is a fixed channel realization of h. Note that the
subchannel (24) is not physically degraded. We now consider
the following subchannel:
Y = h1X +W, Z =
h2h
∗
1
|h1|2
(h1X +W ) + V
′,
if h ∈ A (25)
Y =
h1h
∗
2
|h2|2
(h2X + V ) +W
′, Z = h2X + V,
if h ∈ Ac (26)
where V ′ and W ′ are zero mean proper complex Gaussian
random variables with variances ν2− |h2|
2
|h1|2
µ2 and µ2− |h1|
2
|h2|2
ν2,
respectively. The subchannel (25)/(26) is physically degraded,
and has the same marginal distribution p(y|x) and p(z|x) as
the subchannel (24). Hence by Lemma 1, the parallel wire-
tap channel with subchannels having the form (24) and with
subchannels having the form (25)/(26) have the same secrecy
capacity. We can now apply Corollary 1 to the parallel wire-
tap channel with subchannels having the form (25)/(26). Note
that the subchannel (25) with h ∈ A is degraded in the
same fashion as the K subchannels in (8), and the subchannel
(26) with h ∈ Ac is degraded in the same fashion as the
M subchannels in (8). From Corollary 1, it is clear that the
subchannels with h ∈ Ac do not contribute to the secrecy
capacity. The achievability of (22) now follows from (10) and
(11) by setting the input distribution X ∼ CN (0, P (h)) for
h ∈ A. Note that the summation
∑K
k=1 in (10) becomes the
average Eh∈A for the fading channel.
The converse of (22) follows from the steps that are similar
to those in [2].
We are now left to optimize (22) over power allocations
satisfying EA[P (h)] ≤ P . One can check that the following
function of P (h)
EA
[
log
(
1 +
P (h)|h1|2
µ2
)
− log
(
1 +
P (h)|h2|2
ν2
)]
(27)
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is concave. The optimal P ∗(h) given in (23) can be derived
by the standard Kuhn-Tucker condition (see e.g., [12, p. 314-
315]).
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
We first consider the Rayleigh fading wire-tap channel,
where h1 and h2 are zero mean proper complex Gaussian
random variables with variances 1. Hence |h1|2 and |h2|2 are
exponentially distributed with parameter 1. In Fig. 4 (a), we
plot the optimal power allocation P ∗(h) as a function of h. It
can be seen from the graph that most of the source power is
allocated to the channel states with small |h2|2. This behavior
is shown more clearly in Fig. 4 (b), which plots P ∗(h) as a
function of |h1|2 for different values of |h2|2, and in Fig. 4
(c), which plots P ∗(h) as a function of |h2|2 for different
values of |h1|2. The source node allocates more power to the
channel states with larger |h1|2 to forward more information to
the destination node, and allocates less power for the channel
states with larger |h2|2 to prevent the wire-tapper to obtain
information. It can also be seen from Fig. 4 (b) and Fig. 4
(c) that the source node transmits only when the source-to-
destination channel is better than the source-to-wire-tapper
channel.
Fig. 5 plots the secrecy capacity achieved by the opti-
mal power allocation, and compares it with the secrecy rate
achieved by a uniform power allocation, i.e., allocating the
same power for all channel states h ∈ A. It can be seen that
the uniform power allocation does not provide performance
close to the secrecy capacity for the SNRs of interest. This is
in contrast to the Rayleigh fading channel without the secrecy
constraint, where the uniform power allocation can be close
to optimum even for moderate SNRs. This also demonstrates
that the exact channel state information is important to achieve
higher secrecy rate.
We next consider a fading wire-tap channel, where |h1|2
and |h2|2 are uniformly distributed over finite mass points
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Fig. 6. Comparison of secrecy capacity by optimal power allocation with
secrecy rate by uniform power allocation for a uniformly distributed fading
wire-tap channel
{0.2, 0.4, . . . , 2}. It can be seen from Fig. 6 that the secrecy
rate achieved by the uniform power allocation approaches the
secrecy capacity as SNR increases. Hence the uniform power
allocation can be close to optimum for certain distributions of
the fading gain coefficients.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have established the secrecy capacity for the parallel
wire-tap channel with independent subchannels. We have
further applied this result to obtain the secrecy capacity for the
fading wire-tap channel, where the channel state information is
assumed to be known at both the transmitter and the receiver.
In particular, we have derived the optimal power allocation
scheme to achieve the secrecy capacity. Our numerical results
demonstrate that the channel state information at the transmit-
ter is useful to improve the secrecy capacity.
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